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Abstract 
 President Trump’s presidency can be characterized as unpredictable, controversial, and 
unconventional. One such instance is America’s departure from decades of free-trade advocacy 
under his administration and engagement in trade disputes with numerous nations. By viewing 
the 2018 trade dispute through the political and economic perspectives, this thesis aims to 
understand what the motivating factors are for Trump and his administration to pursue such 
extensive protectionist policies. The author analyzes the tariffs through two main categories: 
those that target an adversarial power, China, and those that target traditional allies like Canada, 
Mexico, and the European Union. The thesis finds that, politically and economically, the 
protectionist policies have a low likelihood of yielding a substantial payout for the Trump 
administration. They also potentially threaten to undermine the U.S-built world order.   
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Chapter 1 – The Art of Trade 
 “Trade wars are good, and easy to win.”1 
 This is one of the more peculiar tweets in President Trump’s collection of strange tweets 
on his social media. However, this tweet represents the Trump administration’s stark departure 
from decades of American-advocacy on free-trade. On the one hand, it is tempting for many to 
dismiss this statement as one of the President’s more unusual statements. After all, many 
Americans have become numb to their President’s behavior on Twitter. On the other hand, his 
supporters can excuse this statement as part of Trump’s larger plan of negotiating more favorable 
trade deals. They can point to his book, The Art of the Deal and claim these tweets and the 
overall larger trade disputes levied on China and allies are all part of the plan. However, Trump’s 
actions suggest a much bleaker picture. 
 President Trump understands that for all his bravado and hyperbolic statements 
throughout his 2016 campaign, he needs to keep at least some of his promises. As his book notes, 
“you can’t con people, at least not for long … if you don’t deliver the [results], people will 
eventually catch on.”2 Indeed, one of Trump’s major foreign policy platforms in 2016 was on 
trade and the unfair advantages that other countries have in free trade deals with the United 
States. He has also promised to negotiate much fairer deals so that other countries can no longer 
exploit America. Therefore, the President is incentivized to deliver results to his supporters.  
However, there are legitimate concerns as to whether this trade dispute will be politically 
and economically effective and beneficial in the long run. Perhaps for Trump, the toughest 
                                                          
1 Donald J. Trump, “When a Country (USA) Is Losing Many Billions of Dollars on Trade,” Tweet, 
@realDonaldTrump, March 2, 2018. 
2 Donald Trump and Tony Schwartz, Trump: The Art of the Deal, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1988). 
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enemies are those who have read his book. His protectionist policies have faced numerous 
retaliatory tariffs that pose a serious threat to undermining global trade and compromising the 
U.S. – built world order. For instance, when attempting to persuade French President Macron to 
convince the E.U. to negotiate with the U.S. over trade measures, Macron referenced The Art of 
the Deal and said that he knows that they “need to retaliate first [to have] some leverage in the 
negotiation.”3  
The primary goal of this thesis is to primarily answer the question of what factors drove 
President Trump to depart from decades of free-trade precedents. It also assesses whether there 
are genuine benefits to pursuing protectionist policies. Chapter two begins with an analysis of the 
political reasons for Trump to engage in trade disputes with numerous countries. Namely, it 
examines the benefits of fulfilling campaign promises. This is examined through two major tariff 
targets: China and the rest of North America. It offers an explanation on why trade protectionism 
against both adversaries and allies may pose serious political risks to the President in the long-
run.  
Chapter three addresses the question of whether the trade dispute will result in tangible 
economic benefits. The first half of the chapter begins with a historical lesson on America’s last 
major protectionist policy and moves to clarify the administration’s apparent misunderstanding 
of trade deficit. The second half examines the economic reasonings of levying tariffs on China 
and long-standing American allies. It finds that there are some legitimate reasons to target China. 
However, there are dangerous risks to act the same way against allies.  
                                                          
3 Rosie Perper, “France’s Macron Reportedly Referenced ‘The Art of the Deal’ to Clap Back at Trump over an 
EU Trade Dispute,” Business Insider. 
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Finally, the last chapter will assess the President’s claim that trade wars are good and 
easy to win. By culminating evidence introduced in the previous two chapters, this thesis 
concludes that trade wars are much more nuanced than the President has put it. There are some 
merits to the current path the administration follows but also legitimate concerns that may bring 
serious consequences to the U.S. and the world   
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Chapter 2 – Driven by Campaign Promises 
 During his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump made many controversial 
comments. Many of them revolved around trade. A constant theme on his campaign trail is how 
many of the country’s trade deals have been “bad.” From calling NAFTA the “worst trade deal 
the U.S. ever signed”4 to claiming that the TPP “is an attack on America’s business,”5 Trump has 
a strong disliking to many significant trade deals. However, while some critics have been quick 
to dismiss the President’s comments as part of his overall unpredictable and unconventional 
behavior, there are underlying political motives for him to instigate the 2018 trade dispute, 
whether that is the renegotiation of NAFTA or the withdrawal from the TPP. 
 Simply put, Trump’s 2018 trade dispute is an attempt to secure domestic political gains 
by fulfilling his campaign promises. The trade disputes are used as a tactic to secure support 
from his critical support base through protectionist policies. Fulfilling his campaign promises 
will provide the President with political capital for future elections. However, while the 
administration’s intention may be to secure political advantages, it is also critical to examine 
whether the desired effect has been achieved. This chapter first analyzes how fulfilled campaign 
promises will provide political gains. It then examines the effects of the Chinese trade dispute 
and the renegotiation of NAFTA, determining whether the fulfilled campaign promises will reap 
long-term benefits.   
                                                          
4 Heather Gandel. “Fact Check: Trump Says NAFTA Was the Worst Trade Deal the U.S. Ever Signed.” 
Fortune.  
5 Adam Taylor. “Analysis | A Timeline of Trump’s Complicated Relationship with the TPP.” Washington 
Post.  
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The benefits of campaign promises  
In economic theory, there are two primary benefits of protectionist trade policies: 
boosting less competitive domestic industries and creating jobs for domestic workers.6 These two 
economic advantages in some ways generate domestic political gains. By erecting protectionist 
policies as the administration has done with tariffs, the President is seeking to protect critical 
U.S. industry such as manufacturing that has been at a disadvantage due to globalization. With 
globalization, more people and companies can interact with foreign entities. With the U.S. being 
a developed country, it has highly established institutions such as labor unions and 
environmental regulations that sometimes make it costlier for firms to operate. Thus, firms move 
abroad to developing countries where they may find cheaper labor or more lax regulations to 
reduce their costs.  
As a result, it creates a decrease in domestic working opportunities. Protectionist policies 
reverse this by making it more attractive for firms to stay home through methods such as 
domestic subsidies to offset the higher costs and taxes to discourage firms from moving abroad. 
Therefore, by helping previously neglected industries to boom again, it creates an increased need 
for new workers to satisfy the new demand, which leads to new employment opportunities. For 
the Trump administration, his support base has been one of the main victims of globalization and 
the outflow of employment opportunities. He also understands that their support is critical to 
future political success. Thus, he has elected to protect his voters’ vital industries.  
Throughout the campaign trail, the President continuously echoed the message that 
previous administrations had neglected domestic industries and allowed them to fall behind 
                                                          
6 Kimberly Amadeo. “Why Protectionism Feels So Good, But Is So Wrong.” The Balance. 
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international competitors.7 In turn, he pledged to punish countries that cheat trade deals with 
tariffs. The recent trade disputes with China and traditional allies demonstrate his commitment to 
fulfill these promises. This strengthens Trump supporters’ belief that the President will follow 
through on more of his campaign promises8 that he may not have had the chance to complete 
before the end of his first term. As a result, future voters will view the President in a more 
favorable perspective as he has kept his promise9 and more willing to support him on his next 
campaign.  
On the one hand, since the tariffs do not appear to have a negative influence on the 
President's approval rating,10 it will only exemplify the positives of him keeping his word. This is 
because Trump gains much more when he keeps his promise in districts that disproportionately 
agree with and support him.11 On the other hand, had the President failed to uphold his promises, 
he would have likely lost future voters since they would react harshly.12 Overall, this strategy is 
politically logical as it provides the President with positive gains. 
China vs. promises: which will prevail? 
One of the major aspects during the 2018 trade dispute has been the ongoing trade rift 
with China. As of November 2018, there has been a total of $250 billion worth of U.S. tariffs 
exclusively applied to China.13 These tariffs were imposed in three rounds. The first round saw a 
25 percent tariff on $34 billion of Chinese good that includes industry parts, vehicles, and 
                                                          
7 Kelsey Rupp. “Trump’s pro-American Trade Policy Is Just What He Promised.” Text. TheHill. 
8 Tabitha Bonilla. The Strategy of Campaign Promises.   
9 Ibid. 
10 Scott Clement and Heather Long. “Analysis | Trump Voters Hit Hard by Tariffs Are Standing by Him — for 
Now.” Washington Post. 
11 Tabitha Bonilla. The Strategy of Campaign Promises.   
12 Ibid.  
13 “The US-China Trade War: A Timeline.” China Briefing News. Last modified September 26, 2018.  
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chemicals. The second round placed a 25 percent tariff on $16 billion of Chinese goods that 
include semiconductors, plastics, and electric scooters. Finally, another 10 percent that would 
transition to 25 percent tariff was placed on $200 billion of Chinese goods that range from 
electronics, food, tools, and housewares. With more threats of taxing nearly all Chinese 
imports,14 the tension with China is arguably the most significant. As the two countries are the 
world’s two largest economies, the outcome of this dispute may have widespread ramifications 
for the current world order.  
When the President referred to “America first” during his presidential campaign, he 
meant a restoration of American pride in global politics. To his supporters, this was one of his 
big selling points. After all, the motto of “Make America Great Again” has arguably become 
synonymous with the President and administration. Upon taking office, Trump withdrew from 
the Trans-Pacific-Partnership, a deal that took the Obama administration six years to craft and 
negotiate.15 This is a move that signaled to both China as well as other countries that the U.S. 
will be taking a radically different stance on free trade. It also sets the impression that the 
President is trustworthy to his supporters as he committed to following through with his view of 
the TPP.   
As a result of pursuing America first policies in international trade, the administration 
slapped tariffs on many Chinese imports to counter China's aggressive geopolitical expansion 
ambitions. Throughout his campaign, Trump attacked China numerous times, claiming that the 
country has crippled, taken advantage, and “raped” the US.16 He accused previous 
                                                          
14 “Trump Ready to Tax Virtually All Chinese Imports to US.” VOA. 
15 Ann M Simmons. “Why the Obama Administration Thinks the Trans-Pacific Partnership Is a Good Deal.” 
Latimes.Com. 
16 Veronica Stracqualursi. News, A. B. C. “10 Times Trump Attacked China.” ABC News. 
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administrations of failing to stand up to China, allowing the U.S. to lose its prestigious status. 
This is another move that attempts to amplify his trustworthiness by committing to his campaign 
promise: punishing those that attempt to take advantage of the country. 
As a result, it appears that Trump has secured short-term political gains for the future. 
However, there are doubts as to whether these moves will bring long-term political benefits. It is 
interesting to note that regarding his America first stance, the President never meant it as an 
isolationist position.17 Nonetheless, throughout his presidency, the country has become 
increasingly isolated. From power vacuums in the Middle East to retreat on human rights 
issues,18 the country has radically changed its stance in international politics compared to prior 
administrations. The tariffs may bring unbearable long-term consequences at the cost of his 
supporters. Furthermore, its decision to withdraw from the TPP may bring more harm than good 
in the long run.  
On the one hand, the TPP was designed to bring benefits to the machinery, auto, plastics, 
and agricultural industries.19 Many of these industries are also the ones that supported Trump 
pledged to protect. For industrial America, on the other hand, it was more ambivalent towards 
the deal.20 However, for industries like agriculture, the deal would have brought $10 billion 
worth of output over 15 years.21 By withdrawing from the TPP, the President is sacrificing his 
supporters to keep a promise that has more uncertain consequences and unclear benefits. 
Furthermore, by withdrawing from the TPP, the President provided room for other rival 
                                                          
17 Doyle McManus. “Trump Says He Stands for ‘America First.’ What Does That Mean?” Latimes.Com. 
18 Michael Birnbaum and Griff White. “A Year of Trump’s ‘America First’ Agenda Has Radically Changed 
the U.S. Role in the World.” Washington Post.  
19 Kimberly Amadeo. “Trump Wants Back Into TPP.” The Balance  
20 Catherine Boudreau. “Trump Country Hit Hard by Chinese Tariffs.” POLITICO. 
21 Ibid. 
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exporters to negotiate new deals that may lead to a higher competitive advantage over U.S. 
exports.22 Indeed, it appears that the President has sacrificed the long-term wellbeing of many of 
his supporters to fulfill his campaign promise.   
For the tariffs on Chinese goods, it appears to be mostly a similar story. To counter the 
decrease in domestic competitive advantage, Trump initiated a series of tariffs to protect these 
industries. However, in response to these tariffs, the Chinese have enacted retaliatory tariffs that 
profoundly impact many of the President's supporters.23 While there has been a lack of hostile 
response from those impacted, it is because many have not yet felt the impact. For instance, 
many of the farmers who produce products affected by the retaliatory tariffs signed contracts 
before the tariffs were implemented. In other words, they sold their products at higher prices 
with more favorable terms.24 As a result, many are waiting to see how the tariffs will affect their 
contracts next year before deciding their stance.  
Moreover, many of the Chinese tariffs were designed to cause tension between Trump 
and his supporters. According to the Brookings Institute, 82% of the counties with tariff-
impacted employment positions voted for Trump.25 As such, it is impractical to prolong the 
tariffs since the Chinese have been very strategic in their response. It is also doubted that many 
of those impacted can endure a period of rising production costs and lower selling prices. 
Therefore, it is still ambiguous as to whether the pain26 that the President has urged his 
                                                          
22 Ibid.  
23 Adam Behsudi. “Trump’s Trade Pullout Roils Rural America.” POLITICO Magazine.  
24 Scott Clement and Heather Long. “Analysis | Trump Voters Hit Hard by Tariffs Are Standing by Him — for 
Now.” Washington Post. 
25 Robert Maxim, Mark Muro, and Jacob Whiton. “How China’s Proposed Tariffs Could Affect U.S. Workers 
and Industries.” Brookings, April 9, 2018.  
26 Heather Long. “Analysis | Trump Is Betting American Families Are Willing to Pay for His Trade War.” 
Washington Post. 
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supporters to bear is genuinely short-term. If the dispute with China does not conclude soon, the 
situation will become much more difficult for his supporters – many may struggle to make ends 
meet as it gets harder to find profitable contracts. 
While the President's ability to fulfill his campaign promises may seem to be a political 
gain at the moment, it may backfire in the long term since these promises come at the potential 
cost of his supporters’ future wellbeing. Furthermore, his America first policy is not even aligned 
with his intended definition and even lean more towards isolationist policies. China’s strategic 
response only decreases the likelihood that his political gains will stand to last as more of his 
supporters feel the negative consequences. Overall, there are serious risks in prolonging the 
Chinese dispute if Trump wishes to accrue long-term political capital. 
Promise fulfilled but little change 
Besides targeting rivals in the trade dispute, the administration has also attacked 
traditional allies. It seems strange for the United States to place tariffs on strategic long-standing 
geopolitical allies like Canada and Mexico. In fact, the U.S. has placed more tariffs on allies than 
it has on China.27 However, it can be understood as an attempt to secure his campaign promise of 
resurrecting the American manufacturing industry28 and prevent American companies from 
moving their productions abroad. In other words, the surprising move to target allies is arguably 
a decision to boost Trump’s domestic credibility and trustworthiness. With a new trade deal in 
place among Canada, United States, and Mexico, it seems that the administration’s bold moves 
                                                          
27 Heather Long. “Analysis | Trump Has Officially Put More Tariffs on U.S. Allies than on China.” 
Washington Post. 
28 Steven Minter. “The Great Manufacturing Employment Challenge.” IndustryWeek. 
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have paid some dividends. Regardless, these unusual moves come at significant risk and cost – it 
may end up hurting the administration and the President's credibility in the long run.   
Throughout his campaign, Trump bashed American companies for shifting their 
productions overseas. Following his America first doctrine, the President vowed to create 25 
million jobs.29 He specifically placed tariffs on steel and aluminum, components critical to the 
manufacturing industry and the vital support base in the rust belt that helped him win the 
election. Also, he has continuously called many previous trade deals horrific. Namely, he 
claimed NAFTA to be "the worst deal in the history of the country."30 Therefore, for the 
President, it is important to follow through on his campaign promises of both bringing back 
overseas jobs as well as renegotiating deals like NAFTA.  
One of the initial moves that the President pursued was to levy tariffs on steel and 
aluminum. Besides citing concerns of national security, he cited unfair trade practices like 
subsidized production as justification.31 According to the American Iron and Steel Institute, the 
President’s tariffs on steel have brought job growth to rust belt cities like those in Illinois.32 In 
the short term, the administration provided a good message for the Republican party to bring 
back to the steel-producing states of Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Michigan.33 For the President 
himself, he can claim the simple story that he has fulfilled his promise of resurrecting vital 
American industries like steel. Indeed, the primary beneficiaries of these tariffs are steel 
corporations. In addition, he managed to renegotiate an allegedly terrible deal to one that he 
                                                          
29 Heather Long. “Trump Vows 25 Million Jobs, Most of Any President.” CNNMoney. 
30 Richard Partington. “Nafta: What Is It and Why Is Trump Trying to Renegotiate?” The Guardian, August 
30, 2018 
31 Thomas Gibson. “Tariffs on Foreign Steel Save American Jobs.” USA TODAY. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Thomas Biescheuvel and Luis-Ann Javier. “Winners and Losers From Trump’s Tariffs on Aluminum and 
Steel,” March 1, 2018.  
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claims to be more favorable, fulfilling a bedrock campaign promise.34 Overall, it appears that 
Trump has succeeded to gain political advantages by keeping his word on campaign promises.  
However, similar to the political advantages seemingly harnessed with the Chinese trade 
dispute, there are more long-term risks that may backfire on the President and the administration. 
Regarding the tariffs that claim to protect vital domestic industries’ interests, they are more 
complicated than one may perceive. While they provide benefits to steel corporations, whether 
these benefits will trickle down to its employees is up for debate. Moreover, for domestic 
corporations that use steel or aluminum as a component like Anheuser-Busch, they may be 
forced to lay off employees to offset increasing costs.35 These firms employ more workers than 
the steel or aluminum industries. As a result, there may be a net loss of jobs with forecasts of 
nearly 180,000 jobs lost as opposed to only 33,000 jobs gained.36  
In fact, the steel and aluminum tariffs have been viewed unfavorably with a 50 percent 
disapproval as opposed to 31 percent approval rating.37 Furthermore, the decrease in overall 
manufacturing jobs cannot be solely blamed on unfair trade practices abroad. Over the past 
decades, there has been a vast increase in worker productivity in the manufacturing sector: 
shrinking from 25 jobs to 6.5 jobs to create $1 million worth of outputs. It would require an 
unrealistic increase in worker productivity in a short amount of time to meet Trump’s 
                                                          
34 Mark Landler and Alan Rappeport. “Trump Hails Revised Nafta Trade Deal, and Sets Up a Showdown With 
China.” The New York Times 
35 Biescheuvel and Javier. “Winners and Losers From Trump’s Tariffs on Aluminum and Steel,”  
36 Rachel Layne. “President Trump’s Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: Winners and Losers.” 
37 William A Galston. “Support for Trump’s Tariffs Even Lower than His Job Approval Rating.” Brookings, 
March 6, 2018. 
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employment growth targets.38 Therefore, while there appear to be short-term political benefits 
with the tariffs, it is likely that these positives will prove to be an overall cost to the country.  
With regards to the newly negotiated trade deal for North America, the USMCA, 
President Trump happily declared the deal as a “historical” transaction. However, there are 
doubts as to whether serious changes exist with the new deal compared to the ill-received 
NAFTA.39 For instance, the significant changes primarily impact automobile manufacturers and 
dairy farmers. For car makers, they are now required to source 75 percent of materials from 
North America as opposed to the previous 62.5 percent for the cars to be tariff-free with at least 
40 to 45 percent of the parts made by workers earning a $16 minimum wage. For the dairy 
industry, American dairy farmers now have increased access to the Canadian market that was 
previously barred with Canadian quotas and import tariffs.40  
These changes that Trump has called historical, may bring more harm than benefits. For 
the auto industry, up to 1.6 million vehicles that were tariff-free under NAFTA will be subject to 
tariffs due to the changed rule of origin.41 This would mean higher costs for both car 
manufacturers and consumers with prices for new vehicles rising by $455 to $6875.42 While 
Trump has cited this change as a means of incentivizing car manufacturers to stay,43 it may 
provide the opposite incentive and lead to job losses. According to the Center for Automotive 
                                                          
38 Mark Liu, Muro and Sifan. “Why Trump’s Factory Job Promises Won’t Pan out—in One Chart.” Brookings, 
November 21, 2016. 
39 Anne Applebaum. “Opinion | Trump’s New NAFTA Is Pretty Much the Same as the Old One — but at 
What Cost?” Washington Post  
40 Alan Beattie and James Politi, “How Is Donald Trump’s USMCA Trade Deal Different from Nafta?”, 
Financial Times, October 1, 2018. 
41 “Meet the New NAFTA - USMCA.” Center for Automotive Research, October 16, 2018. 
42 “Trade Briefing: Consumer Impact of Potential U.S. Section 232 Tariffs & Quotas on Imported Automobiles 
& Automotive Parts.” Center for Automotive Research. 
43 “UNITED STATES–MEXICO–CANADA TRADE FACT SHEET Rebalancing Trade to Support 
Manufacturing” (Office of the United States Trade Representative, October 2018). 
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Research, the rising prices will lead to a decreased demand of nearly 500,000 to two million 
vehicles, affecting over 82,000 to 715,000 jobs.44  
For the dairy industry, the increased access will add about $70 million to the existing 
$230 million export market. However, it will not offset the Mexican and Chinese retaliatory 
tariffs – costing American dairy exports $2.7 billion.45 In addition, the terms are similar to what 
Canada had offered in another ill-received deal, the TPP.46 Therefore, the changes in the new 
deal appear to be rather trivial. At the same time, they may lead to job losses and rising prices for 
many Americans. Furthermore, the deal does not address the steel and aluminum tariffs that 
affect Canada and Mexico.  
It also is important to keep in mind that most Americans view NAFTA as good for the 
United States.47 While more Republicans view NAFTA as a bad deal, this reflects an overall 
partisan trend in the two parties’ views on free trade deals. 67 percent of Democrats are more 
likely to view free trade deals positively whereas only 36 percent of Republicans believe in the 
same.48 However, 56 percent of Americans believe that the pact is beneficial for the United 
States with only 30 and 20 percent think that the deal is more favorable for Mexico and 
Canada.49 Therefore, it seems somewhat unnecessary for Trump to renegotiate the deal. 
Moreover, across all demographics and age groups, there are more Americans in support of 
                                                          
44 “Trade Briefing: Consumer Impact.” Center for Automotive Research 
45 John Brinkley. “USMCA Is Not The Magnificent Trade Deal Trump Says It Is.” Forbes. 
46 Landler and Rappeport. “Trump Hails Revised Nafta Trade Deal” 
47 Alec Tyson. “Most Americans Say NAFTA Is Good for U.S.” Pew Research Center 
48 Bradley Jones. “U.S. Support for Free Trade Agreements Rebounds, but Divisions Remain.” Pew Research 
Center 
49 Tyson. “Most Americans Say NAFTA Is Good for U.S.” Pew  
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NAFTA. It remains to be seen whether this new deal would bring significant positive changes to 
the country. 
Overall, Trump may have appeared to be able to fulfill his campaign promises of 
resurrecting key support bases’ industries and replacing an alleged horrible deal. In the short run, 
this may bring political gains for the President, but the long-term picture is much murkier. In 
particular, the steel and aluminum tariffs may bring greater costs to the country since Trump has 
set unrealistic goals and created the potential for more severe job losses at the expense of fewer 
gains. With NAFTA, the lack of real change brings doubt as to whether it was necessary for the 
deal to be re-negotiated. Furthermore, the changes made may also adversely impact average 
Americans in the long run. Ultimately, there are serious doubts as to whether the targeting of 
traditional allies will pay long-term political dividends.  
Conclusion 
 Even though President Trump's 2018 trade dispute with traditional allies and China may 
appear to be a result of his often-unpredictable behavior, there are arguably underlying political 
motives. Namely, the President may be attempting to secure political advantages for future 
elections through fulfilling campaign promises to his voter base. Indeed, by following his 
America first policy as justification for tariffs against China, erecting policies to protect critical 
American industries, and withdrawing from allegedly terrible deals, it seems that Trump has 
fulfilled his campaign pledges. As a result, he has boosted his image among his supporters as a 
trustworthy and credible individual. There may be greater sentiments to re-elect the President to 
fulfill his other campaign promises that he may not have had the opportunity in his first term. 
 However, the policies that Trump has pursued may put him at a greater political 
disadvantage. While there is support for his actions against China, a prolonged tariff battle may 
17 
 
become an overwhelming burden for his supporters. By withdrawing from the TPP, he has given 
leeway for other countries to explore new deals that exclude the US, which may place domestic 
producers at a competitive disadvantage. Regarding his tariffs that protect his key supporters' 
industries, there are unrealistic expectations concerning job growth and industry revival. It is 
unreasonable to blame the decline in these industries to unfair trade practices. For the newly 
negotiated USCMA, it is unclear whether there will be any real progress as it is largely similar to 
the old NAFTA.  
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Chapter 3 – A Lucky Hit and a Puzzling Decision 
Even though the 2018 trade dispute originates from President Trump’s 2016 campaign 
promises, the primary justification for initiating such a controversial action has been economic. 
From citing concerns of the growing U.S. trade deficit to accusing unethical trade practices like 
stealing intellectual property rights, the administration paints a picture that it must act. While 
some of Trump’s justifications are valid, other reasons that drive the administration’s arguments 
are more dubious. Furthermore, previous protectionist policies have hindered global economic 
growth and left all parties worse off. In addition, the booming U.S. economy may serve as a 
disguise – it may only conceal and delay the eventual negative consequences of the tariffs. These 
misguided reasonings may ultimately harm U.S. and global economic development.  
Overall, the administration’s use of the trade deficit as a central argument for the dispute 
is a mistake. The trade deficit exists for much more complex reasons than Trump articulated. 
This chapter begins with an analysis of what the consequences were after a significant 
protectionist policy like the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. It then looks at how trade deficits work 
and suggests that the administration lacks an understanding of deficits. It then moves to examine 
the economic reasoning behind the disputes with China to determine whether there are valid 
concerns. Finally, the chapter assesses why the administration decided to initiate the puzzling 
move to engage in trade disputes not just with China but also with strategic U.S. allies.  
History lesson with Smoot and Hawley  
The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was one of the major U.S. tariff acts enacted over the past 
century. It was passed to mainly respond to overproduction in the global market that squeezed 
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American producers.50 Despite over 1,000 prominent economists of the time opposing the 
measure, Congress approved the tariff anyway.51 The tariffs increased import duties by about 20 
percent on average. Coupled with deflation, the tariffs reduced imports by about 12-20 percent.52 
Other countries like Canada and Europe soon followed suit with retaliatory measures, leading 
exports to tumble – from $7 billion in 1929 to $2.5 billion in 1932. With exports composing 
nearly seven percent of national productions in the 1930s, the collapse of international trade had 
a significant impact on both domestic and international economies.53  
The tariffs further contributed to the slowdown of the economy and the first stage of the 
Great Depression. It increased the costs for trade-reliant producers. For example, there were over 
500 U.S. plants that employed over 60,000 people to make cheap clothing from imported wool 
rags. Under the tariff, imported wool rags’ price rose by 140 percent, making it prohibitively 
costlier.54 Moreover, the reduction in exports meant that fewer U.S. dollars were circulating in 
the international monetary system. Besides raising the difficulty for foreign countries to repay 
U.S. debts, it further reduced exports. The high tariffs on foreign goods also meant a decrease in 
domestic demand for foreign goods and currency. As such, it artificially appreciated the U.S. 
dollar against foreign currency, which exacerbated the reduction in exports.55 Overall, global 
trade fell a staggering 65 percent.56  
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In terms of the current trade dispute, Smoot-Hawley serves as a good historical lesson: 
protectionist trade policies incentivize economically inefficient behaviors that can undermine 
U.S. reputation and growth. In fact, the current trade dispute has the potential to be more 
devastating than Smoot-Hawley. First, trade barriers encourage other countries to retaliate. Irwin 
argues that, while the Smoot-Hawley tariffs’ impact on trade viewed strictly by itself is relatively 
minor,57 the ripple effect of the tariff devasted trade. It led to retaliatory tariffs, which forced 
many domestic industries to face increased costs. President Trump’s tariffs have already led to a 
myriad of retaliatory tariffs on over $80 billion of U.S. goods.  
Second, the post-World War II global trade order was established by the United States 
through rounds after rounds of free-trade agreement negotiations. Protectionism and retaliation 
threaten to undercut this U.S. built foundation. In other words, it can hamper U.S. influence in 
international politics since there is a risk that the American role in global trade is reduced. Third, 
while the current U.S. economy is unlike that of the 1930s, it does not eliminate the risk of an 
economic slowdown. For Smoot-Hawley, the immediate onset of the Great Depression helped 
policymakers realize the strain the tariffs have on domestic producers, hastening its abolishment. 
The current economic boom actually has the opposite effect – the tariffs’ effects may not be felt 
until a much later date. Moreover, as American exports now comprise 13 percent of GDP58 as 
opposed to only 7 percent during the 1930s along with a more integrated global economy such as 
more interconnected global supply chains, the current trade dispute may have a more severe 
impact than Smoot-Hawley. In fact, the IMF only projects a 3.7 percent growth on global trade 
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due to the trade disputes, 0.2 percent lower than last forecasted.59 Therefore, it is important to 
draw upon the lessons from Smoot-Hawley and keep in mind that current trade policies have the 
potential to be even worse than one of the most major protectionist policies in recent American 
history.  
Trade deficit the scapegoat 
President Trump claimed that the country “lost $817 billion on trade last year”60 on 
Twitter. He is wrong. The net trade deficit in 2017 was $552 billion.61 Although it is tempting to 
dismiss this statement as just one of the President's many controversial and flat-out incorrect 
tweets, it represents his attempt to mischaracterize and wildly exaggerate what trade deficits are. 
Simply put, a trade deficit is when one country imports more goods and services than it exports. 
Conversely, a trade surplus is when one country exports more than it imports. Therefore, a trade 
deficit is not equal to losing money nor is a trade surplus equal to earning money.62  
For most economists, trade deficits are neither good or bad. It depends on the 
circumstances. In other words, they are not inherently bad as Trump has described them to be. 
To better understand trade deficits, it is necessary to recognize the national accounting measure – 
the balance of payments. B.O.P. measures the current and capital accounts. The current account 
refers to goods and services, investment income, and uncompensated transfers like foreign aid. 
Capital account comprises of investment assets like real estate, stocks, bonds, and government 
securities.63 Theoretically, this measure equates to zero because if a country runs a deficit in one 
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account, it will be made up with a surplus in the other. Therefore, trade deficits are also affected 
by other macroeconomic factors that include saving and investment rates and currency values. 
Changing trade policy has minimal effect on the trade deficit.64 
Regarding saving and investment rates, it is related to exports and imports in that a 
country will export its excess savings as the net foreign investment, which means a capital 
account deficit. As the U.S. imports more, it must also experience more investment, leading to 
more capital imports and a capital account surplus. This excess leads to higher consumption, 
which is made up by imports of goods and a current account deficit.65 Currency values also have 
a major influence. For instance, if there were a flow of net investments into a country, the 
demand for that country's currency would rise and appreciate. On the one hand, it would mean 
that the country's exports would become less competitive since they are more expensive. On the 
other hand, imports would become cheaper. This change in imports and exports would occur 
until it matches the capital account as foreign investors seek to outbid domestic consumers for 
the currency until their demand for foreign assets is satisfied.66 
Consider Germany before and after the Cold War. West Germany consistently had a 
current account and trade surplus. However, after the Berlin Wall was toppled, Germany's 
current account suddenly switched into a deficit. This was not because of unfair trade barriers 
from German trading partners but the reintegration of East Germany. The need to rebuild a 
relatively backward country led to the need for large domestic investments, causing a decrease in 
German savings that had been going abroad and, in turn, led to the appreciation of the Deutsche 
Mark. Therefore, it led to a decrease in exports and a rise in imports as German products became 
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more expensive, which caused a trade deficit.67 Similarly, the U.S. trade deficit is not caused by 
unfair foreign trade practices but by its domestic macroeconomic policies and the dollar’s status.  
For the U.S., there is a higher demand for capital than the amount of domestic savings. 
This increased attractiveness for investing leads to higher domestic interest rates, which 
appreciates the dollar. Furthermore, with free-flowing exchange rates and liberalized capital 
flow, foreign capital inflow allows Americans to consume more than they produce, which 
manifest itself in the trade deficit.68 For other countries, this amount of trade deficit is simply 
unsustainable. However, as the dollar is the dominant global reserve currency since many believe 
it a safe asset to hold, it is arguably natural for the U.S. to run such a deficit. Economist Robert 
Triffin warned that the provider of the global reserve currency would need to run perpetual trade 
deficits.69 Furthermore, the dollar’s desirability is also driven by the size of the American 
economy and the ubiquity of the dollar among foreigners.70 Moreover, foreign countries will 
have little incentive to change to alternative reserve currencies because this will create 
instability. Therefore, the dollar's prestigious status places upward pressure on its exchange rate 
and leads to the U.S. to import more than it exports.71 
Since the U.S. trade deficit is mostly driven by its domestic macroeconomic policies and 
the dollar's status, it is doubtful that protectionist policies will effectively reduce the deficit. For 
instance, tariffs would likely lead to a reduction in American imports, which reduces the number 
of dollars flowing into the international monetary system and appreciates the dollar. This 
stronger dollar only means a reduction in exports and an increase in imports until the trade 
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balance matched the savings and investment balance.72 Essentially, without changing the savings 
and investment rates, tariffs would only leave Americans poorer by reducing the volume of 
exports and imports. This is already taking place with Trump’s tariffs. With exports plunging, 
the trade deficit increased $31 billion (8.6%) compared to the amount a year ago.73 Indeed, it 
appears that it is rather ineffective to use tariffs to address the trade deficit since it is a natural 
manifestation of domestic macroeconomic policy and the dollar’s status as the global reserve 
currency. 
The lucky hit 
The trade fight between the two largest economies in the world has had a profound effect 
on the global economy. For the President, it appears that he has the upper hand. The U.S. 
economy is booming whereas the Chinese economy has shown signs of a slowdown. Trump still 
has more Chinese imports to tax whereas the Chinese are running out of American imports on 
which to impose tariffs. While the trade deficit between the two countries has not closed, this is 
arguably due to the President's misunderstanding of how trade deficits work. The tariffs 
nonetheless attempt to address a legitimate economic concern: the unfair advantages and 
disadvantages that Chinese and foreign corporations receive. Namely, this refers to the alleged 
artificial depreciation of the yuan, the subsidies that boost domestic firms’ competitiveness, and 
the bureaucratic red-tape that foreign firms have to overcome to enter the Chinese market such as 
forced technology transfers.  
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President Trump has long accused China as a “currency manipulator.”74 By artificially 
suppressing the yuan’s value, the Chinese government can make its exports more competitive in 
the global market and imports more expensive. It is true that China has been the culprit in 
manipulating its currency around the turn of the millennium. From 2000 to 2014, China boosted 
its foreign reserve by $4 trillion, as it readily bought dollars to depreciate the yuan.75 Until 2005, 
the yuan was also strictly pegged to the dollar.76 However, the Chinese government recently 
shifted away from this practice. Much of the currency manipulation has been actually attempting 
to appreciate the yuan artificially.   
After the effects of the 2008 global recession improved, the yuan steadily declined as 
foreign investors sought better opportunities elsewhere and the Federal Reserve announced rate 
hikes.77 To counteract a severe currency depreciation, the Chinese have been selling off its dollar 
reserve. As of October 2018, it has fallen nearly $1 trillion from its peak of $4 trillion.78 As a 
result, the yuan appreciated 10 percent over 2017.79 Moreover, to reduce the risk of capital flight, 
the government has clamped down on the ability to move the yuan across borders. For instance, 
the government implemented a new policy that prohibits individual citizens from moving more 
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than $50,000 out of the country annually.80 In effect, the authorities are trying to limit the 
amount of yuan that can circulate in the global monetary exchange to drive up its value. 
To complicate matters further, China does not fit the criteria of currency manipulation 
under the 2015 Trade Enforcement Act. To qualify, a country needs to have a large overall 
current account surplus, a large bilateral trade surplus with the United States, and engage in 
persistent one-sided intervention in its currency market to prevent appreciation.81 Currently, 
China only meets one of these criteria – a large trade surplus. Moreover, its current account 
surplus has switched to a deficit82 as Chinese authorities try to combat the market-driven 
depreciation of the yuan. Therefore, it is difficult to label China as the "grand champion of 
currency manipulation" as Trump claimed.83 The country was guilty, but that was more than ten 
years ago.   
Even though it may be difficult to label China as a currency manipulator, the country's 
extensive use of subsidies and tariffs that favor domestic firms are well-documented. In a joint 
statement issued by the U.S., Japan, and the E.U., it called for new rules to regulate industrial 
subsidies and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The three countries also barely veiled their 
discontent with China, calling it “an advanced WTO Members claiming developing country 
status” and urging the Chinese government to shoulder more responsibilities.84 SOEs can also be 
seen as an extension of these subsidies as they have the entire government to fall back on. 
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Indeed, these industrial subsidies shield many domestic industries from global competition and 
hide some firms’ economic inefficiencies.  
Regarding industrial subsidies, China has protected domestic industries and boosted 
exports. For instance, subsidies with export share requirements (ESR), where firms must meet a 
certain export threshold for their production, have had a great effect on Chinese firms. China has 
a staggering number of exporters eligible for ESR subsidies: half of all exporting firms in China 
are eligible as they sell more than 70 percent of their products abroad. This means that an 
extensive percentage of Chinese producers are protected even if they have low-profitability.85 
For example, in the solar industry, government subsidies have helped China’s industry grow ten 
times while depressing world price by 75 percent due to the flooding of solar panels in the global 
market.86 These subsidies have helped to artificially lower the prices by 25 to 30 percent of 
comparable products from the U.S. or the E.U.  
China’s electric vehicle (EVs) industry is also one of the government’s favorite target for 
generous subsidies. In 2017, about 770,000 EVs were produced and sold in China, a 53 percent 
increase from last year and about four times the amount sold in the United States. This growth is 
largely attributed to generous government subsidies. To consumers, the government provides 
$10,000 worth of subsidies per EV purchased along with attractive policies like assured license 
plates that have a 0.1 percent issue rate in some provinces. To EV producers, government 
subsidies account for more than 50 percent of the cost of the batteries. For example, government 
subsidies and grants have accounted for nearly 19 percent of Geely’s, a leading Chinese 
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automobile manufacturer, gross profit at one point. 87 It is projected that the total number of EVs 
in China will reach 2 million in 2020.88 In other words, the government has been covering the 
economic inefficiencies of domestic companies that would have been otherwise exposed by the 
market and artificially boosting industries that would have been unprofitable in the short run. 
Consequently, when government subsidies for the solar industry declined, many solar-panel 
producing firms, particularly those unprofitable, defaulted on their loans.89 When government 
subsidies for EV manufacturers declined, sales for carmakers like BYD fell 20 percent.90 
In terms of SOEs, they are protected by the government from competition and even 
bankruptcy.91 This is accomplished primarily through an assured market share for these firms. 
Non-state-owned enterprises are prohibited from expanding beyond a certain position.92 For 
instance, the Chinese aviation industry is primarily comprised of three major state-owned 
airlines: China Southern, China Eastern, and Air China. Together, they account for a domestic 
market share of 77 percent.93 The fourth largest and privately-owned airline, Hainan Airlines, 
only accounts for 7 percent of the market share.94 In contrast, the three big U.S. airlines – 
American, Delta, and United Continental take up only 50 percent of the market share.95 It is also 
doubtful whether competition can genuinely exist between these state enterprises. It is a common 
practice for the state to appoint Communist Party officials to senior executive positions in these 
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SOEs. In effect, the Party is coordinating large and key sectors to work together, running the 
country like a business.96 Therefore, the extensive market consolidation in China, and a lack of 
real competition, insulates SOEs and arguably creates state monopolies.97  
Perhaps the coercive technology transfer practice has been the most contentious issue for 
the Trump administration. The White House claims that China has been one of the main culprits 
of intellectual property theft and accounts for 87 percent of counterfeit goods seized entering the 
United States.98 It identified forced technology transfer, licensing at less than economic value, 
state-directed acquisition of sensitive U.S. technology, and outright cyber theft as egregious 
policies that risk 44 million American technology jobs. Specifically, for forced technology 
transfers, the administration claims that China uses foreign restrictions, administration review, 
and licensing processes to acquire these technologies.99 The Chinese have rejected the argument, 
claiming that the U.S. argument is pure speculation and based on a presumption of guilt.100 
Forced technology transfers refer to situations when foreign firms are coerced by the 
government through exploitative policies to transfer strategically significant technology to 
independent domestic entities. In China’s case, the government utilizes its attractive market size 
as leverage to “convince” foreign firms to hand over their technologies if they want to enter the 
market. For instance, as many strategic industries in China are dominated by the state, foreign 
firms in these industries that want to gain market access will have to work with domestic SOEs. 
As these industries follow government orders, which have gradually pivoted to purchasing more 
Chinese products, they increasingly insist foreign firms transfer their technologies to nascent 
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domestic companies as a precondition. This is done in the hope that domestic companies will 
learn and develop the capabilities to produce these products in the future, eventually eliminating 
the need to rely on foreign technologies. 
While some have dismissed this issue as overstated for the U.S. and the benefits 
exaggerated for China,101 there is real harm of such coercive technology transfers to global 
innovation spirit. According to the Coase Theorem, low transaction costs and well-defined 
property rights are the fundamental building blocks to maximize efficiency. Similarly, well-
defined and enforced intellectual property rights are also key incentives for individuals and firms 
to innovate. Furthermore, forced technology transfers may bring unexpected long-term costs to 
the firm.  
A good case study to understand the negative consequences of forced technology 
transfers is with the Japanese firm, Kawasaki. Capturing the Chinese government’s desire to 
modernize its mass-transportation system, Kawasaki established a joint-venture with Chinese 
manufacturers to construct a high-speed rail system, which is a key strategic industry to the 
government. While the contracts were enticing, Kawasaki also feared that it would lose its 
competitive edge if it chose not to participate in the Chinese market. However, it also did not 
realize that after Chinese manufacturers had acquired and learned the technology, Kawasaki 
would be phased out of the Chinese rail industry. Furthermore, these domestic firms like the 
state-owned CRH would become fierce competitors on the global stage, working on projects in 
Venezuela and Turkey while bidding for contracts in the U.S., Brazil, and Russia. The Chinese 
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manufacturers also misled Kawasaki: they filed for patents that were intended solely for 
domestic use.102  
In the EV auto industry, there also exists the potential for similar exploits. For foreign 
automakers to enter the Chinese market, they have to conduct joint-ventures with domestic 
producers as the majority owner. The government also requires foreign automakers to 
incorporate new EV technologies in any production of EVs.103 For instance, in late 2016, a new 
Chinese law mandates that all EV producers demonstrate that they own the technology to 
produce the entire vehicle. However, foreign-owned technology cannot be counted. Essentially, 
it requires foreign companies to transfer their foreign technology to the domestic entities for it to 
obey the law and continue production.104 As seen through Kawasaki’s example, these technology 
transfers often do not end positively in the long run.  
Moreover, mandatory technology audits prior to mass production begins appear to be 
fraudulent. Foreign carmakers have accused Chinese auditing teams and domestic carmakers of 
collusion: “when the audit begins, the inspectors asked for only the blueprints of the EV 
components that the foreign company was striving to protect from its Chinese JV partner.”105 
However, these practices do not appear to drive foreign carmakers away. Franco-Japanese 
company Renault-Nissan recently signed an EV JV with Chinese company Dongfeng Motors. 
Ford also partnered with Zotye Autos to produce EVs.106 These partnerships in existing 
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conditions create risky situations in which foreign companies may follow a similar path as 
Kawasaki. As such, the firm that transfers the technology may find the initial deal lucrative and 
entry to a new market tempting. However, once the transfer is complete, new competitors may 
emerge that pose a serious threat in the long run. Overall, the lax intellectual property protection 
laws as well as the forced technology transfers are the primary drivers that both discourage 
innovation and harm firms in the future. 
Ultimately, industrial subsidies and forced technology transfers are legitimate sources of 
concern for the U.S. in contrast to concerns over currency manipulation. On the one hand, the 
extensive subsidies protect unprofitable firms while the hyper-consolidated SOEs create real 
concern for fair trade terms. In particular, the insulation from global protection places U.S. firms 
at a disadvantage. On the other hand, the forced technology transfers harm not only U.S. but also 
global innovation sentiment. The lax IP law enforcement creates a situation in which foreign 
firms can be misled to share technologies that will be detrimental to their future wellbeing.  
The puzzling move  
While President Trump's trade battle with China has some logic, his decision to attack 
long-standing allies is more puzzling. Specifically, Trump has placed tariffs on steel and 
aluminum coming from Europe and North America using the justification of protecting national 
security. However, the reasoning and the tariff targets are misplaced. In the long run, these tariffs 
will damage not only the U.S.’ reputation but also the global economy. As such, imposing these 
tariffs based on incorrect reasoning is a dangerous gamble for the Trump administration. 
In June 2018, the U.S. announced steel and aluminum tariffs of 25 and 10 percent 
respectively on the EU, Canada, and Mexico. It also offered few details on what these countries 
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could do to end these tariffs.107 The President justified them as measures to protect national 
security. However, the definition of it was rather broad. Commerce Secretary Ross believes that 
“national security is broadly defined to include the economy, to include the impact on 
employment [and that] economic security is military security.”108 A Commerce Department 
investigation also reports that the current quantities of steel imports weaken the economy and the 
lack of domestic aluminum production may decrease U.S. military manufacturing independence. 
However, while the Secretary of Defense acknowledges the decline of domestic manufacturing, 
he also notes that the military’s requirement for steel and aluminum only represent about three 
percent of U.S. production and current capabilities do not affect DoD’s ability to acquire the 
necessary steel and aluminum.109 Therefore, current production capabilities are adequate. 
In addition to the negligible impact that steel and aluminum imports have on the military, 
it is also unclear the national security threat that traditional allies pose. Canada is the largest 
source of steel and aluminum imports, accounting for 17 percent of steel and 36 percent of 
aluminum for 2017.110 The administration’s reasoning on how Canada would constitute a 
national security threat – in this case, by failing to provide the necessary aluminum and steel – is 
unclear. The logic is further muddled when Canada is formally considered a part of the American 
technology and industrial base. Under Title 10 of the U.S. code, items are considered foreign 
when they are not sourced from the United States or Canada.111 Therefore, these tariffs are 
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confusing and harm the relationship with long-standing U.S. allies. As Canadian Prime Minister 
Justin Trudeau puts it: 
Our soldiers who had fought and died together on the beaches of World War II, on the 
mountains of Afghanistan and have stood shoulder-to-shoulder in some of the most 
difficult places in the world, that are always there for each other, [the idea that Canada is 
a national security threat] is insulting to them.112 
 
While U.S. allies find it absurd to see themselves referenced as national security threats, 
they nonetheless initiated retaliatory tariffs. The EU, Mexico, and Canada have all filed 
complaints in the WTO regarding U.S. actions. The E.U. placed a 25 percent tariffs on iconic 
American goods like whiskey, tobacco, and Harley Davidson products worth about $3.2 
billion.113 Mexico’s retaliatory tariff focused on U.S. agricultural exports like apples and 
cranberries as well as American steel products. It imposed a tariff between 15 and 25 percent that 
will cover nearly $3 billion goods.114 Canada imposed 10 and 25 percent tariffs on U.S. 
aluminum and steel imports worth about $13 billion.115 
The tariffs and retaliatory tariffs also pose significant harm to the U.S. and global 
economy. Even though these tariffs may benefit domestic steel and aluminum manufacturers, it 
will harm the downstream producers that rely on these products as these products are now more 
expensive. For instance, forecasts show that the auto industry, which relies on steel, can expect 
declining sales that potentially lead to job losses of up to 40,000 – nearly a third of the entire 
steel industry workforce. In short, the auto industry’s job losses would nullify any job gains in 
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the steel industry.116 Overall, it is estimated that for every steel or aluminum job gained, sixteen 
would be lost in return. According to consulting firm Trade Partnership Worldwide, the 
President’s steel and aluminum tariffs would lead to a net job loss of over 400,000.117 
To complicate matters further, Trump's tariffs are also hitting the wrong targets. There is 
a significant issue with global steel trade: overcapacity, which refers to when a domestic 
manufacturer produces more than its domestic consumers can absorb and is incentivized through 
unfair trade practices to sell internationally. However, steel overcapacity is not caused by the 
E.U., Canada, or Mexico. China causes it. Chinese steel overcapacity is roughly 130 million 
tons, which is 65 percent higher than total U.S. crude steel production in 2016.118 As such, 
Trump's tariffs hit close allies like Canada and Mexico harder than the real culprit. Furthermore, 
the new USMCA does not address these tariffs, putting the retaliatory tariff in place for the time 
being. Therefore, there continues to exist a threat to the economy and key sectors like the 
automobile industry. Coupled with the stricter criteria for automobiles to be tariff-free, it 
increases the difficulty for car makers to produce USMCA-eligible cars. 
 Ultimately, President Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs are confusing and dangerous. 
They are misdirected and do not truly address the problem of global steel overcapacity. They 
pose significant risks to the U.S. economy in the form of job losses that outweigh any job gains 
in the aluminum and steel sectors. They also can adversely affect U.S. relationships with long-
standing allies that find it insulting to be considered national security risks. Overall, the steel and 
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aluminum tariffs on close allies do not make sense – it poses long-term risks that may only 
undermine the U.S. economy while failing to address the actual problem. 
Conclusion 
President Trump’s primary economic argument for the 2018 trade dispute is misdirected. 
By citing a large trade deficit as justification demonstrates a lack of understanding from this 
administration. This is both dangerous and inefficient. Furthermore, it is arguably natural for the 
U.S. to have a large trade deficit due to its large economy and the dollars’ prestige and safety. If 
Trump genuinely wants to address the deficit, he should enact policies that target the investment 
and savings rate. Using tariffs as tools have indirect effects at best and bring about a host of other 
economic problems. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act serves a historical precedent and lesson – its 
effect led to a collapse of global trade and a decline of overall living standards. The current trade 
dispute has the potential to be even more devastating than one of the largest protectionist policies 
the U.S. has ever pursued. 
That said, Trump’s tariffs on China do address some of China’s unfair practices. Even 
though China no longer manipulates its currency to boost its exports, the country's practice of 
generous state subsidies and lax intellectual property protection pose serious harm to American 
producers. These are valid concerns and are legitimate for the President to address. However, 
using similar tariffs to target long-standing allies pose more risks than benefits. By citing 
national security reasons as for the steel and aluminum tariffs, it damages the relationship with 
key allies that have supported the U.S. in many international fronts and can lead to severe 
economic consequences in the form of job losses. Ultimately, there are both legitimate and 
misdirected economic reasoning to Trump’s 2018 trade dispute. 
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Chapter 4 – The Art of the Deal? 
 It is tempting to dismiss President Trump’s view on the 2018 trade dispute as a part of his 
overall unpredictable behavior. However, by looking through the disputes in the political and 
economic perspectives, it is easy to see that his view on trade is rather dangerous. Frankly, the 
evidence analyzed in this thesis serves as a direct rebuttal to his assertion that trade wars are 
good and easy to win. From a political perspective, the long-term outlook for this trade war 
appears to be bleak. While there are short-term gains by fulfilling campaign promises, American 
voters will still catch on when conditions turn dire. More specifically, the retaliatory tariffs 
disproportionately affect his supporters, who have not yet felt the effects. In other words, the 
President is running a serious political gamble with the trade disputes that may backfire. His 
initial supporters may abandon him as the trade disputes harm their livelihood and become too 
overwhelming.  
 From an economic perspective, the President demonstrates his apparent misunderstanding 
about trade, which may have contributed to his idea of trade wars being good and easy to win. 
By not fully understanding how deficits work, it casts a cloud of doubt over the administration’s 
other policies since many may deem them untrustworthy and uncapable. Nonetheless, there are 
still legitimate reasons for utilizing protectionist policies on China as the Chinese have 
demonstrated a knack for pursuing policies such as generous state subsidies and forced 
technology transfers to gain unfair advantages. However, the U.S. should not go down this route 
with allies. Besides being politically damaging, the tariffs on allies do not address the true 
problem.  
 Overall, trade wars are far more nuanced and sophisticated than the President believes. 
The stark departure from decades of free-trade advocacy serves as the potential to shake the 
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foundation of U.S.-led global order. However, it is important for many to keep in mind that this 
trade dispute should not be seen as an apocalyptic event. For many allies, while the President’s 
rhetoric and some of his policies have damaged relations, the ultimate target is China.  
For the current administration, although it is correct in targeting China, it must also 
remember the harm that a trade dispute with the second largest economy in the world can bring. 
Trump must also clarify his justifications as some are incorrect and only undermine his 
legitimacy. The President must realize the political risks of engaging in a sustained dispute and 
understand the correct economic reasons for engaging in such a trade war. Only then can he truly 
demonstrate to his critics that his bombastic tweets are just a part of the larger plan to achieve a 
better deal. 
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